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Approach to Religion As a Factor in 
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Disputes 
Rebecca Korzec· 
And when they had brought a sword before the king, he said, "Divide 
the living child in two and give half to the one, and half to the other." 
But the woman whose child was alive said to the king, "I beseech thee, 
my Lord, give her the child alive and do not kill it." But the other said, 
"Let it be neither mine nor thine, but divide it." 
I Kings 3:24-26 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Simms was Jewish; his wife-to-be was Catholic. They married in 
a Jewish religious ceremony and raised their children as Jews. Follow-
ing their separation, Mrs. Simms resumed the practice of Catholicism, 
taking the children to church with her. Mr. Simms objected. In 1987, a 
Colorado district court granted physical custody of the Simms children 
to their Catholic mother, while granting "spiritual custody") "for the 
purposes of determining religious training" to their Jewish father. 2 
The problem of religious differences between divorced parents is 
increasing. Cases such as Simms require courts to make Solomonic 
judgments. What role should the religious beliefs and needs of parents 
and children play in child custody and visitation decisions? Should 
courts even consider religious preferences or should they remain "neu-
tral" by refusing to consider religious questions under any 
circumstances? 
Ultimately, the right to decide child custody and visitation disputes 
between parents rests in the power of the state acting as parens patriae: 
society as the ultimate parent. Without question, child custody and vis-
itation decisions limit parental control in child-rearing. Private con-
• Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. Johnson, Struggle for Custody of Children's Faith Becomes Nightmare, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. II, 1988, at I, col. 1. 
2. Gersovitz v. Siegner, 238 Mont. 506, 509-10, 779 P.2d 883, 885 (1989) 
(quoting the appellant citing In re Marriage of Simms (unpublished decision». 
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cerns are transformed into state-regulated public rights. Decisions 
concerning the role of religion in custody and visitation cases have 
failed to resolve the difficult constitutional, ethical and moral issues 
involved.3 
However, resolution of these questions is crucial. With more than 
fifty percent of marriages ending in divorce, an alarming number of 
children find their lives disrupted.4 When the original family's stability 
is shattered, children become particularly vulnerable to parental con-
flict in all areas. 5 Religious differences, affecting the most sensitive, 
personal concerns of the individual, are likely to create conflicts. Con-
sequently, courts often are required to make difficult custody deci-
sions-decisions which usually are couched in terms of the best 
interests of the child.6 Are religious concerns valid factors within the 
"best interests" formula?7 And, if so, should the prior express and im-
plied agreements of the parents be validated? 
This article focuses on the role of religious conflict between parents 
in determining child custody and visitation disputes. It suggests a 
framework for reconciling parental control over religious observance 
and training with the state's duty to protect the child's best interests. 
First, it examines the history of English and American child custody law 
and analyzes modern custody cases in which religion is a factor. Next, 
it addresses the alarming recent attempt by courts to resolve religious 
disputes with a shared custody approach, awarding "spiritual custody" 
to one parent and "physical custody" to the other. 
Finally, this article proposes a contractual approach to the question 
of religion in parental child custody and visitation disputes. Since reli-
3. However, there are significant scholarly contributions which address· these 
questions. See, e.g., Beschle, God Bless The Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in 
Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1989); Mangrum, 
Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May be Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child 
Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981). See also Note, The Establishment Clause 
and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation. 82 
MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984). The potential conflict between the constitutional rights 
of parent and child is discussed in Note, Developments in the Law - The Constitution alld 
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1377-83 (1980). 
4. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 85 (1989). 
5. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 108-20 (1980). 
Interestingly, children in the midst of parental divorce often perceived their 
parents to be "unhappy." Yet the overwhelming majority preferred the unhappy 
marriage to the divorce. Id. at 10. 
6. See generally S. KRAM & N. FRANK, THE LAw OF CHIl.D CUSTODY: 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 3 (1982); Mnookin. Child-Cwtodv 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions ill the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
226 (1975). 
7. Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical Perspective: A St/l((\' 0/ Chal/gil/g: Sorial 
Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-Americall Law, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119 
(1986). See also Foster & Freed, Life with Father, II FAM. L.Q 321 (I!l7H). 
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gion is a legitimate issue to be considered in fashioning child custody 
decisions, courts should be required to consider the religious needs of 
the child, as a component of the child's educational and psychological 
well-being. However, constitutional issues need not be reached. In-
deed, it is likely that courts can avoid most troublesome constitutional 
issues by enforcing the express and implied contracts created by the 
parties before their divorce. Ultimately, the approach suggested here 
most effectively protects the actual religious needs of parents and chil-
dren by enforcing the express and implied contracts created in the in-
tact, pre-divorce family. 
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY LAw 
A. English Common Law Concepts 
Modern child custody law has evolved from the historical Roman 
rule of patria potesta 8 to the current standard of best interests of the 
child.9 Historically, the father possessed absolute authority over his le-
gitimate child. \0 As the legal, religious, and moral head of the family, 
the father controlled the education, religious training, person and 
property of the child. Blackstone described the supremacy of these pa-
ternal rights at common law as follows: 
The power of a parent by our English laws is ... still sufficient to 
keep the child in order and obedience .... The legal power of a father 
(for a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence 
and respect,) the power of a father, I say, over the persons of his chil-
dren ceases at the age of twenty-one: for they are then enfranchised by 
arriving at years of discretion, ... when the empire of the father, or 
other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason. Yet, till that age 
arrives, this empire of the father continues even after his death; for he 
may by his will appoint a guardian to his children. 1 1 
Nonetheless, this absolute parental power was qualified by Lord Mans-
field in the cases of Rex v. Delaval 12 and Blissets Case. 13 In Delaval, the 
father apprenticed his daughter to a music teacher, who in turn as-
signed the indenture to Delaval, ostensibly for music training, but in 
8. According to this doctrine of exclusive paternal ownership of the child, the 
father even had the right to terminate the child's life. See, e.g., The King v. 
Greenhill, III Eng. Rep. 926 (1836). 
9. See Foster & Freed, supra note 7, at 325-29. 
10. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REV. 
205 (1971). 
II. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 452-53 (17th ed. 
1830). 
12. 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763). 
13. 98 Eng. Rep. 899 (K.B. 1773). See also Foster & Freed, supra note 7, at 325-
26 for a general discussion of the significance of these cases in the development of 
child custody law. 
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fact to be kept as a mistress. 14 Mansfield granted a writ of habeas 
corpus setting the child free. As a result, the father was deprived of a 
significant property right to the 'services of his child' as the 'transac-
tion' was "grossly against public decency and good manners."15 
Similarly, Blissets Case represented a further encroachment on the 
common law rule of paternal control over children. In that custody 
case, the wife left her abusive husband, taking their six-year old daugh-
ter with her. In denying the writ of habeas corpus filed by the father to 
obtain his child, Lord Mansfield concluded that the natural right of the 
father would be limited as follows: 
[T]he paternal authority as to its civil force was founded in nature, and 
the care presumed which he would take for the education of the child; 
but if he would not provide for its support, he abandoned his right to 
the custody of the child's person, or if he would educate it in a manner 
forbidden by the laws of the State, the public right of the community to 
superintend the education of its members, and disallow what for its 
own security and welfare it should see good to disallow, went beyond 
the right and authority of the father. 16 
Taken together, these cases foreshadowed developments which 
would eventually emerge as the "best interests" test. 17 For the first 
time, the interests of the child, rather than the father, dominated. 
As previously discussed, the father's common law right to control 
his legitimate child included the child's religious training. The com-
mon law doctrine of religion sequitur patrem 18 defined the rule of paternal 
preference in religious matters concerning his child, provided the fa-
ther actually professed religious beliefs. The rigidity of this doctrine 
controlled the chancery decision in Hawksworth v. Hawksworth. 19 There, 
a Roman Catholic father died leaving a Protestant widow and a six 
month old daughter. The mother raised the child as a Protestant for 
eight years before the paternal relatives instituted an action demanding 
that the child be raised as a Catholic. The Lord Justice acknowledged 
that ordering the child to be raised as a Catholic would not promote 
her welfare. Nevertheless, he concluded as follows: 
Were I at liberty to follow my own opinion, I should have no hesitation 
in acceding to (the mother's) argument. For to direct that this ward 
should be brought up in the Roman Catholic faith will be to create a 
14. Delaval, 97 Eng. Rep. at 915. The charge was conspiracy to assign a female 
apprentice "for the purpose of prostitution." /d. 
15. [d. 
16. Blissets, 98 Eng. Rep. at 900. 
17. Foster & Freed, supra note 7, at 326. 
18. One of the most famous early cases involved the poet Percy Bysshe Shellev, 
an atheist. Shelley was denied custody of his two young children following the 
suicide of their mother, in part, because he professed no religious belief. Shelley v. 
Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch. 1817). 
19. 6 L.R.-Ch. 539 (1871). 
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barrier between a widowed mother and her only child; to annul the 
mother's influence over her daughter on the most important of all sub-
jects, with the almost inevitable effect of weakening it on all others; to 
introduce a disturbing element into a union that ought to be as close, 
as warm, and as absolute as any known to man; and lastly, to inflict 
severe pain on both mother and child. But it is clear that no argument 
which would recognize any right in the widowed mother to bring up 
her child in a religion different from the father's can be allowed to 
weigh with me at all. According to the law of this Court the mother has 
no such right .... [T]he child must be brought up in her father's 
faith. 2o 
This decision, supporting the paternal right to control the child's 
religion even after the father's death, was affirmed on appeal, expressly 
permitting, "the religion of the father ... to prevail over the religion of 
the mother" and even "the interests of the child .... "21 
Gradually, the rigidity of the common law rule upholding paternal 
control over religious matters was softened by equitable principles, 
which gave preference to the child's welfare over mindless adherence 
to common law precepts. Ultimately, this preference for the child's 
welfare was codified by a series of nineteenth and twentieth century 
statutes. For example, amendments to the Custody of Infants Act of 
183922 permitted chancery courts to award custody of children under 
the age of seven to the mother. Eventually, the welfare of the child 
emerged as the "first and paramount consideration"23 in custody deci-
sions. As a result, parental rights have been given increasingly less 
significance.24 
B. The American Approach 
In the United States, courts refused to apply the rule of paternal 
preference as rigorously as it had been applied in England. Competing 
with the rule of paternal preference was the emerging tender years doc-
trine,25 which gave the mother preference in custody disputes involv-
ing young children. Subsequently, the developing best interests 
doctrine26 displaced this maternal preference and subordinated the in-
terests of both parents to the child's welfare. 
In Commentaries on Equity jurisprudence,27 Justice Story relied heavily 
20. /d. at 540-41 n.1. 
21. /d. at 545. 
22. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3 
Vict., ch. 54, § I. 
23. Guardianship of Minors Act, 1971, 19 & 20 Eliz. 2, ch. 3. 
24. Hall, The Waning of Parental Rights, 31 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 248 (1972). 
25. See Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 
423 (1976) for a discussion of the tender years doctrine. 
26. See generally S. KRAM & N. FRANK, supra note 6. 
27. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQ..UITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1742-84 (14th ed. 
1918). 
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on English authority in defining the parameters of American child cus-
tody law. Justice Story's primary objective was to establish that the 
state, under its police power, could intervene against the natural rights 
of the father to custody and control of the child. Although his analysis 
of the law of parent and child commenced with the acknowledgment of 
the indisputable right of the father to have the custody of his chil-
dren,28 Justice Story ultimately recognized the state's power to limit 
paternal rights. For example, in United States v. Bainhridge,29 a father 
filed a writ of habeas corpus to obtain custody of his minor son who had 
enlisted in the Navy without paternal consent. Story denied the writ on 
the basis of the State's superior authority, subject to constitutional lim-
its, to restrict parental rights as required by the public interest: 
Be the right of parents, in relation to the custody and services of their 
children, whatever they may, they are rights depending upon the mere 
municipal rules of the state, and may be enlarged, restrained, and lim-
ited as the wisdom or policy of the times may dictate, unless the legisla-
tive power be controlled by some constitutional prohibition.3o 
Today, most states provide a decisional standard for custody dis-
putes other than judicial discretion. At least twelve states simply pro-
vide the "best interests" of the child or the "general welfare" of the 
child3) as the standard. Other jurisdictions identify a few general fac-
tors that are deemed to be in the child's best interest.32 Some states 
have have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which is es-
sentiallya "best interests" test with factors identified.33 Other jurisdic-
tions have modified the Uniform Act to include other factors. 34 Finally, 
some jurisdictions provide an extensive list "of factors to be [relied 
upon] in determining the best interests of the child."35 Although these 
statutes sometimes mention the wishes or interests of the parents as a 
factor in custody cases, the main thrust is the interest of the child, not 
parental rights.36 
28. [d. § 1760. 
29. 24 F. Cas. 946 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816). 
30. !d. at 949. 
31. Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interest of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 
YALE L. & POLICY REV. 267, 268 n.3 (1987) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-326 
(1986); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West 1983 & 1987 Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 
(West 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (Burns 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 403.270 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MD. FAM. LAw CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984 & 
1986 Supp.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.312(3) (Callaghan 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 452.375 (Vernon 1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 36-6-101 (1986); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.07 (Vernon 1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 767.24 (West 1981». 
32. !d. at 268. 
33. See VNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A V.L.A. 561 (1987). 
34. See Note, Child Custody Modification Under The UniJo17Tl Marriage and Divorce Act: 
A Statute To End The Tug-oi-War?, 67 WASH. V.L.Q 923, 926 n.22 (1989). 
35. See Charlow, supra note 31, at 268. 
36. See generally Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes ill 
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Clearly, in the law of child custody the "best interests" of the child 
has replaced the almost absolute preference for paternal rights. 
Notwithstanding this evolution, the apparent clarity of the "best inter-
ests" standard vanishes when child custody cases raise constitutional 
issues which the courts feel compelled to consider. In the end, courts 
may be forced to balance constitutional rights with the "best interests" 
standard. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND CHILD CUSTODY 
Both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the first 
amendment may affect religious disputes between divorced parents.37 
Any discussion of constitutional issues in the context of family law must 
begin with Meyer v. Nebraska 38 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 39 First, in 
Meyer, a teacher at a "parochial school maintained by Zion Evangelical 
Lutheran Congregation" was convicted of violating a statute proscrib-
ing the teaching of any modern language other than English in the first 
eight grades.40 In reversing this conviction, the Court held the statute 
to be violative of the due process provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment.41 The Court held that certain governmental deprivations of lib-
erty are unconstitutional regardless of the adequacies of procedures 
followed in enforcing the restrictions. Among the various aspects of 
liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, the Court included 
the following: 
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint 
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the 
common occupations oflife, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the 
dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.42 
Further, in Pierce, the Supreme Court invalidated an Oregon com-
pulsory public school education law on the basis of substantive due 
process and parental right. The Court held that the right of the parent 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 487-99 (1984) for an examination of the principles 
used in deciding what is the best interest of the child. CJ. Elster, SolomonieJudgments: 
Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,11-28 (1987). 
37. The first amendment provides in pertinent pan as follows: "Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is made applicable 
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Presbyterian Church in the 
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440 (1969). 
38. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
39. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
40. Meyer. 262 U.S. at 397. 
41. /d. 
42. Id. at 399. 
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to control the education of the child could not be overridden by the 
state's interest in standardizing the education of children concluding 
that: 
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize 
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers 
only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nur-
ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.43 
Since the decisions in Meyer and Pierce, family rights have received 
increasing protection under various constitutional doctrines. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut 44 and Roe v. Wade,45 the Supreme Court expanded 
the constitutional limitations on the state's regulation of private, per-
sonal family matters. In Griswold, a majority of the Justices recognized 
that the Due Process Clause furnishes the basis for the right to marital 
privacy.46 Similarly, in Roe, the majority recognized a woman's right to 
choose abortion is based in the Due Process Clause.47 The Court has 
continued to rely on the Due Process Clause in other family law cases.48 
Equal protection arguments have also been successful in overturn-
ing state intervention in family issues. In Orr v. Orr,49 for example, an 
Alabama statute permitting alimony awards only to women was rejected 
on Equal Protection grounds.50 Similarly, in Stanley v. lllinois,51 the 
Court relied upon both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
to invalidate a statute that deprived unwed fathers of custody rights.52 
Similarly, numerous state courts have invalidated, on equal protection 
grounds, statutes granting maternal preference in custody disputes.53 
Both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses have been em-
ployed successfully in defense of family rights against state interven-
tion. The principle case favoring family autonomy in religious 
educational decisions is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 54 There, the Supreme Court 
invalidated the state compulsory high school education statute as viola-
tive of the fundamental rights of Amish parents to educate their chil-
43. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
44. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
45. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
46. Griswold, 381 U.S. al 486 (Goldberg, j., concurring), 499 (Harlan, j., con-
curring), 502 (While, j., concurring). 
47. Roe, 410 V.S. a1153. 
48. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1978); Moore v. Cily of 
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,496 (1977). 
49. 440 U.S. 268 (1979). 
50. Id. al 282-83. 
51. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
52. Id. al 646, 650. 
53. See generally NOle, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: JILltifiraliolis I/lid /.lIl1ill//iOIlS. 
26 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1974). 
54. 406 V.S. 205 (1972). 
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dren in a religious atmosphere.55 Unlike Meyer and Pierce, the Yoder 
Court specifically considered both the state's police power56 and 
parens patriae power,57 holding that neither could displace the paren-
tal right to control minor children with respect to religious education. 
The Amish parents had refused to send their children to public or pri-
vate schools following completion of the eighth grade, arguing that 
their religion would be contravened by sending their children to high 
schools.58 The Court stated that, in order to uphold the state regula-
tion in question, Wisconsin would have to establish a "state interest of 
sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under 
the Free Exercise Clause."59 
It can be argued that the family rights cases, taken as a whole, 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court will demand the greatest defer-
ence to family autonomy. The right of the parent to direct the religious 
education of children has been deemed by the Court to be "fundamen-
tal,"60 and "cardinal. "61 Intrusion on such significant areas of privacy 
and autonomy will be justified only by the showing of substantial state 
interest. 
Examination of the constitutional limitations on the use of religion 
as a factor in child custody and visitation decisions must consider Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.62 There, the Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test 
for determining whether state action violates the Establishment Clause. 
Under the Lemon test, constitutionally prohibited activities are those 
which (1) lack a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion; and (3) constitute excessive government entan-
glement with religion.63 
The Supreme Court has concluded that the Establishment Clause of 
the first amendment prohibits courts from resolving "controversies 
over religious doctrine and practice."64 Hence, civil courts which re-
solve ecclesiastical questions violate the required separation between 
church and state.65 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recognized 
certain "neutral principles of law, developed for use in all [church] 
55. [d. at 234. 
56. [d. at 220. 
57. [d. at 229. 
58. [d. at 207-09. 
59. [d. at 214. 
60. !d. at 232. 
61. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The Court also noted that 
"the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their 
children is basic in the structure of our society." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 639 (1968). 
62. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
63. [d. at 612-13. 
64. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
65. !d. at 449-50. 
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property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches 
to which property is awarded. "66 
Significantly, in Jones v. Woif,67 a property dispute between local 
church factions, the Court clearly adopted this "neutral principles of 
law"68 theory, which first had been suggested in earlier church prop-
erty dispute cases. The Jones Court acknowledged that the "neutral 
principles" approach could require a civil court to review religious doc-
uments concerning property ownership. However, the Court explained 
that "the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the 
neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be 
occasional problems in application."69 
IV. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE CUSTODY PROBLEM 
The New York Court of Appeals applied "neutral principles" to a 
family religious dispute in Avitzur v. Avitzur.70 The Avitzurs married in a 
traditional Jewish ceremony. As part of the ceremony, the parties 
signed a ketubah (marriage contract), which provided that marital diffi-
culties could be resolved by a Bet Din (religious court) if either party so 
desired. The husband obtained a civil divorce, but refused to grant his 
wife a religious divorce (get). Under Jewish law only the husband can 
obtain the get; if he refuses, the wife can never remarry.7! Mrs. Avitzur 
brought suit for specific performance to force her recalcitrant husband 
to appear before the religious court to obtain the get. The New York 
Court of Appeals concluded that the ketubah (marriage contract) consti-
tuted a private agreement between the Avitzurs which is enforceable 
under "neutral principles". Consequently, enforcement of this private 
marriage contract would not offend first amendment safeguards. 
Ultimately, the Avitzur court permitted judicial enforcement of a 
religious contract because such enforcement could be effectuated on 
secular terms, employing neutral principles. As a result, Avitzur com-
ports with the Supreme Court's approach in Jones v. Woif by insisting 
that "a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in 
purely secular terms .... "72 Since contract enforcement constitutes a 
secular purpose-the protection of reasonable contractual expecta-
tions-it neither advances nor inhibits religion. As a result, courts do 
not violate the Lemon test by effectuating the voluntary, private agree-
66. Id. at 449. 
67. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
68. !d. at 602-03. 
69. Id. at 604. 
70. 58 N.Y.2d 108,446 N.E.2d 136,459 N.Y.S.2d 572, arl. denied, 464 U.S. 817 
(1983). 
71. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIAJUDAICA 122, 130 (1971). The wife who cannot obtain agel 
is an agunah, a woman who cannot remarry according to Onhodox and 
Conservative Judaism. 
72. 443 U.S. 595,604 (1979). 
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ments of husband and wife, even if such contracts originate from reli-
gIOus sources. 
Arguably, the Avitzur principles can be applied to custody disputes 
by developing a purely contractual approach which honors the express 
and implied agreements concerning religion formulated by the pre-di-
vorce family. Significantly, this contractual approach would not offend 
constitutional safeguards. In fact, first amendment issues need not be 
reached.73 
Moreover, the proposed contractual approach is a substantial im-
provement over the current patchwork of inconsistent case law, which 
is largely unworkable and unpredictable. A survey of the case law 
reveals several discernible approaches to the religion issue, which con-
flict with the goal of achieving stability for children following parental 
divorce. Because only a few states dictate the factors to be weighed in 
determining the child's best interests, courts have wide discretion in 
considering religious differences between parents.74 
Notwithstanding such judicial freedom, several trends emerge. 
First, courts are not permitted to rule on the comparative merits of dif-
ferent religions.75 In fact, preferring the parent who professes reli-
gious beliefs to one who chooses non theism may violate the first 
amendment. 76 This approach requires that courts exhibit judicial 
"neutrality" regarding the relative merits of parental religious beliefs. 
Second, courts are permitted to consider "moral" issues, as well as the 
child's "spiritual" welfare.77 Nevertheless, courts place limits on the 
religion inquiry. For example. religion may not be the primary factor in 
custody decisions.78 Other courts refuse to consider religion unless the 
particular circumstances present clear evidence of physical, emotional, 
or social benefit or detriment to the child. 79 Finally, some courts distin-
guish between children with "actual religious needs"80 and those fami-
lies without demonstrated needs. 
73. There is a basic judicial duty of self-restraint, which instructs judges to 
avoid deciding questionable constitutional issues when possible. See, e.g.,J. NOWAK, 
R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 93 (2d ed. 1983). 
74. See, e.g., Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960) (listing factors to 
be considered). 
75. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(establishment clause prevents governmental preference of one denomination or 
sect). See, e.g., Goodman v. Goodman, 180 Neb. 83, 141 N.W.2d 445 (1966). 
76. Jimmy Swaggert Ministeries v. Board of Equalization, 110 S. Ct. 688, 697-
98 (1990) (collecting cases and authorities). 
77. See, e.g., Burnham v. Burnham, 208 Neb. 498, 502, 304 N.W.2d 58, 61 
(1981). 
78. See, e.g., Frank v. Frank, 26 Ill. App. 2d 16,20,167 N.E.2d 577, 580 (1960); 
Anhalt v. Fessler, 6 Kan. App. 2d 921, 923, 636 P.2d 224, 226 (1981). 
79. Cases are collected at Annotation, Religion As Factor in Child Custody and 
Visitation Cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971 (1983). 
80. [d. 
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V. JOINT CUSTODY CONSIDERATIONS 
Some courts apply a joint or shared custody approach to the reli-
gion question. As previously noted, in In re Marriage of Simms,8! the 
Colorado district court granted physical custody to the Catholic mother 
and "spiritual" custody to the Jewish father. This approach is inimical 
to the needs of parents and children. By 1988, more than thirty s'tates 
had enacted legislation permitting, encouraging, or even compelling 
joint custody arrangements in which both divorced parents decide ma-
jor issues concerning the child.82 In some instances, the child even di-
vides time equally between both parental homes. Initially, joint 
custody promised an ideal form of parenting by divorced parties, en-
couraging them to remain involved, interested parents.83 
However, the initial enthusiasm for compulsory or imposed joint 
custody has waned.84 Divorced parties cannot be forced to parent to-
gether in a productive, loving manner; they must parent voluntarily. In 
fact, forced joint custody may work against the child's interests by fos-
tering parental hostility. 
Divorce involving intermarried partners may be particularly vulner-
able to such hostility. Research demonstrates that " ... intermarriages 
are more likely to end in divorce than in-group marriages."85 More-
over, individuals experiencing the trauma and disorientation of divorce 
often seek solace in their ethnic and religious roots. Joint custody is 
simply inappropriate under these circumstances.86 
VI. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
Recent scholarship criticizes the "best interests" test as arbitrary, 
unpredictable and gender-based.87 In Beyond the Best Interests of the 
Child,88 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit suggest a gender-neutral standard 
81. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
82. J. FOLBERG, JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 7 (1984). 
83. Canacakos,joint Custody As A Fundamental Right, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1981) 
(arguing parent has a constitutional right to joint custody). 
84. See, e.g., Singer & Reynolds, A Dissent on joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497 
(1988); Holmes, Imposedjoint Legal Custody: Children's Interests or Parental Rights?, 45 
U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 2 (1987); Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: An Overview, 4 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 105 (1986); Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinkingjoint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. 
LJ. 455 (1984); Comment, The Unfulfilled Promise of joint Custody in Montana, 48 
MONT. L. REV. 135 (1987). 
85. SCHNEIDER, INTERMARRIAGE: THE CHALLENGE OF LIVING WITH DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND JEWS 119 (1989). 
86. Coysh, Parental Postdivorce Adjustment In joint and Sole/Physical Custody Families, 
10 J. FAM. ISSUES 52 (1989). 
87. See, e.g., Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change 
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Ester, Maryland 
Custody Law - Fully Committed to the Child's Best Interests?, 41 MD. L. REV. 225 (1982). 
88. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 31-64 (1973). 
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which promotes the child's stability after parental divorce. This view-
point creates a strong presumption favoring custody in the child's "psy-
chological" parent, the parent with whom the child has forged the 
primary emotional bond. The strength of this "psychological" parent 
test lies in its emphasis on stability as an essential antidote to domestic 
unrest.89 As a matter of fairness, the "psychological" parent is usually 
the one who has devoted more time and energy to the child in the pre-
divorce family. Often such demonstrated commitment to the child has 
been at the expense of the parent's professional, economic, or other 
personal goals.90 
VII. ACTUAL RELIGIOUS NEEDS AND THE PRE-DIVORCE FAMILY 
Research concerning the relationship between religion and emo-
tional health offers mixed conclusions.91 Some studies suggest that 
self-esteem and ego-strength are associated with religious belief.92 A 
survey of the literature in the early 1980s provides "marginal support 
for a positive effect ofreligion."93 However, more recent findings have 
concluded that " ... the capacity to find purpose and meaning beyond 
one's self and the immediate and to relate positively to God" correlates 
in a positive manner with self-esteem, social skills, and purpose in 
life.94 
Perhaps the mixed conclusions suggested by empirical research re-
sult from the cultural and legal definition of religion. Studies reveal 
that traditional theism is not the only method of achieving "transcen-
dence"-the ability to find meaning and purpose beyond one's self. 
Transcendence is the trait generally identified with feelings of emo-
tional health.95 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court originally defined religion in 
terms of conventional theism. In Davis v. Beason,96 the Court concluded 
that, "[t]he term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations 
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his 
89. See generally Allison & Furstenberg, How Marital Dissolution Affects Children, 25 
DEV'L PSYCHOLOGY 540 (1989). 
90. See, e.g., BECK, THE GENDER FACTORY (1985); Liefland, Career Patterns of Male 
and Female Lawyers, 35 BUFFALO L. REV. 601 (1986) (women lawyers act as primary 
childcare providers within family); Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of 
Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1785-87 (1986). 
91. Roof, Concepts and Indicators of Religious Commitment: A Critical Review, in THE 
RELIGIOUS DIMENSION: NEW DIRECTIONS IN QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH 17 (1979). 
92. Bergin, Religiosity and Mental Health: A Critical Reevaluation and Meta-Analysis, 
14 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY RES. & PROC. 170 (1983). 
93. Id. at 176. 
94. Ellison, Spiritual Well-Being: Conceptualization and Measurement, 11 J. 
PSYCHOLOGY & THEOL. 330, 338 (1983). 
95. Id. 
96. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
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being and character, and of obedience to his will."97 In other words, 
religion is theistic and resembles conventional Christianity. In 1961, 
however, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there could be reli-
gions "which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief 
in the existence of God."98 During the Vietnam War period, the 
Supreme Court recognized a broader definition of religion based on 
"religious training and belief."99 Most significantly, the Court held 
that "religion" encompassed any system recognizing "duties superior 
to those arising from any human relation, ... "100 
If "religion" is broadly defined, it can be viewed as having a secular 
purpose as defined in Lemon. To the extent that "religion," defined in 
both theistic and non-theistic terms, helps the child achieve emotional 
well-being, it should be considered in determining custody. 
A recent Pennsylvania case, Zummo v. Zummo,101 exemplifies much 
that is unworkable in the current judicial approach to religion in cus-
tody disputes. Paula and David Zummo were married in 1978 and di-
vorced in 1988. Three children were born of the marriage, Adam, 
Rachael, and Daniel. Paula was raised as a Jew and "actively practiced 
her faith since childhood."102 The trial court concluded that the par-
ties had discussed their religious differences prior to their marriage and 
had agreed orally that any children would be raised in the Jewish 
faith. 103 Moreover, "[ d]uring the marriage, the Zummo family partici-
pated fully in the life of the Jewish faith and community .... All three 
of the children were formally given Hebrew names. Before the parties 
separated, the children attended no religious services outside the Jew-
ish faith."104 
Following the separation, the Zummos agreed to share legal cus-
tody. Under this agreement, the mother had primary physical custody, 
subject to the father's partial physical custody on alternating weekends, 
and certain holidays and vacation periods. l05 However, Mr. Zummo 
refused to have the children attend Jewish Sunday School during his 
visitation. He preferred to take them to Roman Catholic services in-
stead.106 The trial court held that Mr. Zummo was obliged to arrange 
97. /d. at 342. 
98. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961) (Maryland's requirement 
that public officers declare belief in God held unconstitutional). 
99. Military Selective Service Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 456 (j) (1982». 
100. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 346 (1970) (Harian,j., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
101. 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990). 
102. [d. at 51, 574 A.2d at 1141. Under traditional Jewish law, children born ofa 
Jewish mother are considered Jewish. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at 52,574 A.2d at 1141. 
105. /d. 
106. /d. 
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for the children's attendance at Jewish Sunday School, and that he 
would not be permitted to take the children to religious services con-
trary to the Jewish faith. 107 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed, concluding that "it is 
constitutionally impermissible to decide a custody or visitation dispute, 
in whole or in part, on the basis of a determination of or consideration 
of the parent's relative devoutness."108 The court specifically vacated 
that portion of the trial court's order which prevented Mr. Zummo from 
taking his children to religious services "contrary to the Jewish faith" 109 
because the facts failed to demonstrate "a substantial threat of present 
or future physical or emotional harm" to the children. I 10 
Zummo exemplifies the shortcoming of the current judicial approach, 
in that it fails to promote post-divorce family stability by ignoring the 
legitimate and reasonable religious contracts formed by the pre-divorce 
family. Simply stated, the Zummo pre-divorce contract reflected the 
parties' intent to be a Jewish family. As recognized by both the trial 
court and the Zummo majority, the parents agreed to raise the children 
as Jews and performed that agreement during the entire marriage. lll 
Even Mr. Zummo admitted that his desire to have the children attend 
church constituted a break from prior practice. In fact, Mr. Zummo 
testified at trial that his children are Jewish. I 12 He further testified that 
he did not want the children to suffer identity problems with reli-
gion. 113 However, the Zummo result nearly guarantees that the children 
will have identity problems, causing needless post-divorce instability 
and trauma. 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that children cannot be raised 
as both Christians and Jews without sustaining psychological IOSS.114 
Raising a child simultaneously in both religions "is something of an 
oxymoron-to be a Christian, you must believe that Jesus Christ, as the 
son of God, came to earth to die for the sins of humanity. Jews do not 
believe in the divinity of Jesus, or in many other central tenets of 
Christianity." 115 
Because the Zummos wished to avoid such instability and confusion, 
they chose to raise their children in one religion, rather than two. 
Their agreement, affecting both the parents and the children, should 
107. Id. at 53, 574 A.2d at 1142 (emphasis added). 
108. !d. at 73, 574 A.2d at 1152. 
109. Id. at 85, 574 A.2d at 1158. 
110. /d. at 83, 574 A.2d at 1157. 
Ill. Id. at 88, 574 A.2d at 1159-60 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
112. Id. at 88, 574 A.2d at 1159 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
113. !d. at 88, 574 A.2d at 1159-60 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
114. Goldman, In Dual-Faith Families Children Struggle for a Spiritual Home, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 18, 1988, at Cl, col. 2. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 85; 
Erstenoff, Forcing Rites on Children, 1 AM. FAM. 13 (1987). 
115. SCHNEIDER, supra note 85, at 157. 
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not have been breached merely because the parents divorced. What 
the Zummo majority refused to consider is that the religious agreement 
affected not only the parents, but also the children. Although the court 
recognized parental authority over the religious upbringing of children 
within the family setting, it created other rules for post-divorce fami-
lies. 116 Instead of enforcing the Zummo family pre-divorce contract 
concerning religion, the court adopted a shared custody approach, per-
mitting each parent to "pursue whatever course of religious indoctrina-
tion which 'that parent sees fit ... during periods of lawful custody or 
visitation."117 The tragedy of Zummo is that it completely frustrates rea-
sonable family expectations and stability at precisely the moment they 
are most critical. 
VIII. THE CONTRACT ApPROACH 
The contract approach to religious disputes between divorcing or 
divorced parents avoids the pitfalls of the current case law, especially 
disasters such as Zummo and Simms. Courts would enforce family pre-
divorce contracts in the post-divorce context. Inquiry would focus on 
whether the parents had entered into an express or implied in fact con-
tract agreement regarding the children's religion. If such an express or 
implied in fact agreement exists, the courts would enforce it, absent a 
clear showing of actual physical harm to the children. 
The parents' express written agreement 1 18 could be secular (such as 
a premarital or separation agreement) or religious (such as a Ketubah). 
If the agreement is merely oral (such as the agreement in Zummo) it will 
be enforced upon a showing of actual performance during the mar-
riage. For example, raising the children in a specific religion by tacit 
agreement would be evidence of actual performance. The actions in 
Zummo, which demonstrated that the children were raised as Jews, 
would meet this contractual test. In the same vein, performing the 
same acts without any agreement, would constitute a valid implied in 
fact contract, deserving of post-divorce enforcement. 
This contractual method would meet the Lemon test of secular pur-
pose. Indeed, like Avitzur, the suggested approach would employ neu-
tral principles of contract enforcement to satisfy constitutional 
safeguards. Most significantly, enforcing pre-divorce religious con-
tracts increases the possibility for stability and certainty for both par-
ents and children. 
116. Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. at 46, 574 A.2d at 1138. 
117. !d. at 49-50,574 A.2d at 1140. 
118. Some jurisdictions, most notably New York, enforce express written 
contracts concerning religion. See, e.g., Lebovich v. Wilson, 155 A.D.2d 291, 547 
N.Y.S.2d 54 (1989); Stevenot v. Stevenot, 133 A.D.2d 820, 520 N.Y.S.2d 197 
(1987). 
